Making the Case for the Welfare State by Taylor-Gooby, Peter
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Taylor-Gooby, Peter  (2015) Making the Case for the Welfare State.   Policy and Politics, 43
 (4).   pp. 597-614.  ISSN 0305-5736.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1332/147084414X14081190124376






Making the Case for the Welfare State 
Abstract 
The UK welfare state is under unprecedented attack from (1) harsh spending cuts, focussed 
particularly on benefits and services for women, children, low-paid people and claimers of 
working age, and (2) a profound restructuring programme, which is fragmenting services and 
embedding private provision across the state sector. It is proving surprisingly difficult for 
pro-welfare state actors to make a case for generous state welfare that is both inclusive and 
electorally attractive. This paper analyses why this is so and what can be done about it.  It 
discusses trends in the development of state welfare and in the way the issues are understood, 
the trilemma that pro-welfare policy-making faces, proposals for new directions in policy and 
a reform programme that might help build a more inclusive welfare discourse. It argues that 
any government that wishes to build a more inclusive society must implement policies that 
progressively reframe the way people think about work, reward and the role of government. 
Keywords 
Welfare state; social risks; redistribution; reframing; social inclusion 
1. Context 
One account of the story of the post-war development of state welfare tells the story in terms 
of old and new social risks (Bonoli 2005, 2007, Taylor-Gooby 2004). Welfare states after the 
Second World War built on pre-war traditions and institutions to provide services to meet the 
common needs experienced by citizens in the course of normal everyday life. They were 
class collaborative in the sense that needs, provision and political support cut across middle 
class and working class groupings (Jessop 2002). They were highly gendered in their 
emphasis on health care, pensions, education and interruptions to wages through short-term 
unemployment, sickness and disability, geared to the needs of male workers and shaped by 
their assumption that care services were a free good produced by the unwaged labour of 
women in the home (Williams 1989). They were also nationalistic in that they were based on 
nation-state control of the economy to guarantee high levels of employment and implement a 
cohesive national social contract. 
The development of more open, globalised and competitive international markets coupled 
with technological changes and shifts away from manufacturing towards service-sector 
employment increasingly individualised people’s experience, undermined the trade-union 
collectivism that had been a powerful force for state welfare and set in train the trend towards 
greater dispersion of market incomes. Allied with demographic shifts and changes in family 
patterns and in work, the entry of large numbers of women into full-time employment and the 
development of women’s interests as a political force, these shifts also led to the emergence 
of New Social Risks in three main areas: 
- In relation to work, to do with access to jobs, adequate wages on which to live a 
normal family life, security in work once a job is found, decent working conditions 
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and employment protection, education and training, extending to retraining and life-
long work and regional issues as the centres of economic activity became 
concentrated in the South; 
 
- In relation to women and family life, issues of gender equality, equal opportunity and 
discrimination emerged, together with pressures to provide child and elder care 
services as private households found it increasingly difficult to meet these needs; 
 
- In relation to the wider range of inequalities encountered in the labour market, the 
need for benefits and services for those of working age became pressing: an 
increasing proportion of workers were unable to command a ‘family wage’.. 
The development of new social risks (NSR) alongside old social risks (OSR) has led to major 
changes in the structure of the welfare state. An increasing proportion of resources is directed 
to NSR services. In 1979 benefits for those of working age because they were on low 
incomes or jobless made up about 12 per cent of social security spending, and mainly 
consisted of benefits to unemployed people. By 2010 equivalent provision accounted for 
about 36 per cent, five-sixths of this directed to families to pay rent/council tax and to 
supplement low wages (Browne and Hood 2012, Figure 4.3). 
The UK welfare state has always been dualised between services for the mass of the 
population (predominantly OSR provision) and services for low-income people 
(predominantly to meet NSRs and often means-tested). In general OSR services (health care, 
pensions, education and sickness/disability benefits) are rather better funded, horizontally 
redistributive between life states and highly popular according to the standard interview 
questions of the BSA (Bamfield and Horton 2009). In contrast NSR services (benefits for low 
waged people in work and unemployed people) are more meagrely funded, more stringently 
regulated and highly stigmatic. The services to meet child and elder care needs occupy a 
middle position, slowly developing towards a broader range of coverage but enjoying rather 
less public support than the established OSR services. 
NSR services to meet needs for income and labour market access are relatively cheap, 
accounting for five to six per cent of GDP, as opposed to some 25 per cent on OSR services. 
They are vital in preventing poverty rising even higher than the present 18 per cent (OECD 
2013) to mirror the fanning out of market inequalities, as the UK moves from a typical 
European pattern of inequality to one much closer to that of the US (Figure 1, Atkinson 
2007). However they are at the heart of public debate about the future of the welfare state and 
are central to the problems encountered by those who wish to develop a politically viable pro-
welfare strategy. 
The main issue here is the lack of public sympathy with welfare for jobless people and those 
on low incomes (Baumberg, Bell and Gaffney 2012; Van Oorschott 2000, 2006). 
Unemployment fell during the late 1990s and early years of the 21st century to rise rapidly 
(along with insecurity and involuntary part-time working) after the 2008-9 financial crisis and 
subsequent stagnation. For most of that period, endorsement of the view that benefits are too 
3 
 
high and damage work incentives mirrored unemployment, falling when unemployment rose 
and rising when it fell, according to the authoriatative annual British Attitudes Survey. This 
pattern lends itself to intuitive interpretation: people feel more sympathetic to those on 
benefits when it is harder to get a job and vice versa. However, during the current crisis, 
stigmatic attitudes have grown harsher. Despite The fact that unemployment rose from about 
5.5 per cent in 2008 to 7.5 in 2009, and then continued to rise at a slower pace, agreement 
with the assumption that benefits function as work disincentives has continued to rise, from 
53 to 65 per cent of the population. Similarly and despite increasing numbers in poverty from 
2005 onwards and further expected increases in the future (Brewer et al, 2011), support for 
more spending on the poor had fallen from 36 to 28 per cent by 2011. 
The impact of public concern about these benefits for low-waged and jobless people and their 
families, which are a relatively minor area of public spending, is amplified by misleading 
perceptions of how significant they are. A series of studies including Fabian Society (2000), 
Horton and Gregory (2009), Taylor-Gooby (2009, ch 9), Ipsos-Mori (2013) and many others 
shows that most people exaggerate the scale of short-term benefit spending, often appearing 
to believe that it bulks as large as or larger than pension spending and is a major driving force 
in the growth of the welfare state. Misconceptions about taxation also play a role. The 
literature summarised in Taylor-Gooby (2013a ch 2 and 3) shows that most people believe 
that taxes on people’s incomes provide by far the greater part of state revenues. In reality, 
income tax finances some 25.5 per cent of state spending with employees’ national insurance 
making up 7 per cent (IFS; OECD 2013). Popular conceptions also exaggerate the 
progressivity of direct taxation. These assumptions support imagery of the welfare state as 
primarily an engine of vertical redistribution from mass to minority and minimise the 
horizontally redistributive role of most social spending. 
Explanations of benefit stigma 
In discussion of public attitudes to welfare it is helpful to distinguish short-run political 
factors from longer-term structural changes in society. The former include the 
communications by politicians (particularly but not exclusively on the right) and the majority 
of mass media which demonise claimers as scroungers and promote a distinction between the 
mass as ‘strivers’, seeking to take responsibility for their own lives, and a minority of 
outsiders who seek to live by different and exploitative rules. Baumberg, Bell and Gaffney 
(2012) analyse the way in which such statements reinforce stigma and build on pre-existing 
assumptions in the population, showing how attitudes are linked to media treatment of those 
on benefits. 
Concern about the moral status of claimers predates recent political manoeuvres (for 
example, Golding and Middleton 1986, Dean and Taylor-Gooby 1992) and a full explanation 
must look to more structural changes.  Longer run factors include processes which lead to 
greater social divisions and to the decline in cohesive social institutions and changes in 
assumptions about the values driving behaviour which moralise these divisions. The attitude 
data indicates long-run trends extending under very different governments.  The 
interpretation that these are driven by changes in the circumstances of peoples’ lives is 
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reinforced by analysis of the British Social Attitudes survey from a recent Demos/JRF/Ipsos-
Mori study that indicates robust generational differences in support for spending on the poor 
(Ipsos-Mori 2013; see Figure 2). The implication is that an early experience of pre-war 
austerity fostered commitment to state welfare. Post-war affluence reduced the level of 
support somewhat. The uncertainty associated with the oil price hikes and recession in the 
1970s weakened support further. The ascendancy of new right liberalism in the 1980s 
substantially reinforced suspicion of redistributive social provision. 
Figure 2 about here 
One of the major trends in our society is the onward march of market inequality noted earlier. 
This is linked to the increasing dominance of capital in relation to labour noted by Glynn (and 
2006)  and indicated by the fall in the share of national income received by workers from 
more than 70 per cent in the 1970s to about 60 per cent in the 2000s (Bailey et al. 2011). 
These processes coincide with the greater fragmentation of the workforce in the transition 
from manufacturing to service sector employment. Further factors are processes of regional 
and spatial development (Dorling and Ballas 2008) which increasingly segregate individuals 
by social status and income group. These changes help to build and are reinforced by social 
processes which undermine cohesive institutions such as trade unions and collective 
structures in the work place, common experiences of schooling and of community life, of 
leisure activity, in religion and in other areas of people’s experience (Putnam 2000). Ethnic 
diversity provides another potential axis of separation. Greater flexibility in family life and 
geographical mobility and stronger generational differences reinforce these processes. In 
short social divisions grow stronger and cohesive institutions weaker. 
These divisions increasingly become moralised as people experience their lives as determined 
by individual effort rather than as they outcome of collective forces.  The ‘tightening link’ 
between education, skill and work achievement is an important factor since educational 
outcomes are widely believed to be primary the product of individual effort and ability rather 
than of opportunity support and context (Green 2013).  The experience of job search and 
employment as primarily an individual process reinforces this.  In this context the 
moralisation of social inequalities as attributable to individual effort, to doing what you ought 
to do and not doing what you shouldn’t, rather than to social factors becomes normal. Failure 
not only leads to poverty and claiming, it is a matter of shame and stigma. This is the context 
which facilitates a politics of division and makes the task of designing an approach to welfare 
which confronts these divisions harder. 
The pro-welfare trilemma 
The problem faced by advocates of a generous welfare state may be thought of as a trilemma. 
The minimum conditions for a pro-welfare programme are that it should be inclusive (a 
programme that leaves out some groups on grounds not relevant to their level of welfare need 
is not fully a welfare programme), effective (it should actually be capable of meeting needs) 
and it should be electable (otherwise there is no point). Figure 3 summarises these issues in 
relation to short-term welfare where there are strong moral concerns about the desert of 
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claimers. One can imagine inclusive and effective policies (for example social dividend/ 
citizen’s wage) but such policies are unlikely to be attractive because they give money to 
people without test of desert. Inclusive electable policies would have to include strict rules 
about the application of inclusiveness to ensure that inclusion is interpreted to provide strong 
motives for valued behaviour and this would damage their effectiveness. Effective and 
electable policies (for example decent contributory benefits as currently under discussion on 
the centre-left) would not be inclusive. 
Figure 3 about here 
These constraints are much less damaging in the case of OSR services since these are highly 
popular.  The resources necessary to sustain them can in principle be levied. There are a 
number of issues about the structure of and access to current provision which bear on 
effectiveness. A number of writers have pointed to social divisions in universal services (for 
example Titmuss 1955, Le Grand 2007). Addressing these issues may well require additional 
targeting on particular groups within common provision (for example, the Spearhead 
programme in health care or the Education Action Zone and Excellence in Cities initiatives in 
education in the early 2000s), curbs on the extent to which minorities can buy privilege 
through private provision and withdrawal of subsidies to such provision in pensions, 
schooling or health care, and programmes to expand the access of least well served groups to 
public provision. They can also be inclusive, and measures which address effectiveness may 
also reinforce inclusiveness.  
The double crisis: OSR services 
A substantial literature raises a different kind of problem in relation to OSR provision. A 
number of analyses point to pressures in this area in the longer-term future. Three factors are 
most commonly emphasized. First population ageing (the demographic ‘time-bomb’) will 
impose growing pressures on spending in these areas, particularly on health and social care 
and pensions. Secondly, the difficulty in achieving productivity gains in the service sector 
comparable to those in the manufacturing industry will result in a transfer of resources over 
time to the state sector – the ‘Baumol wage effect’. Thirdly, rising public expectations will 
put continual pressures on state services. 
It is of course hard to predict long-run future developments and these arguments may be more 
important in terms of their impact on current debates, as justification for immediate cut-backs 
on the grounds that these will prevent future problems, rather than as a guide to what will 
actually happen. Much depends on what happens in terms of economic growth and the UKs 
continuing attractiveness to migrants. For example, growth at a rate of two per cent during 
the next 50 years, rather lower than that achieved in the past half century, will produce a GDP 
about 2.7 times as large. Recent reports by OBR (2012) and the EC (2012) using slightly 
different methodologies, both produce central estimates of the projected extra demand at 
between four and five per cent of future GDP. These are substantial amounts, but may well be 
feasible in the context of greatly expanded real resources. Immigration is typically assumed 
to play a major role in reducing demographic imbalances in the UK. 
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There are perhaps three reasons why the long-run crisis in OSR services may be less pressing 
than is sometimes suggested: 
- Analyses of productivity gains in the state human services indicate that health care 
and education have roughly kept pace with wage rises during the period since the 
early 1990s under different governments and a variety of market, managerial, target-
centred, efficiency saving, training and other regimes designed to maintain pressure 
on costs (cf Hardie et al 2011, Baird et al 2010, Jurd 2011). This implies that wage 
drift may be contained provided pressure to improve cost-efficiency in the services is 
maintained. 
 
- Secondly people are willing to pay for increases; the best evidence for this is that they 
have paid for increased spending at a higher rate than necessary in the past. Between 
1979/80 and 2007/8, under governments of very different political ideology and a 
range of policy regimes, total spending on health care, education and personal care 
rose from £75.1bn. to £234.5bn. at 2008-9 prices, a growth rate of more than four per 
cent (Hills 2011, 597). Private spending additional to state spending in health care and 
education has increased even faster, from 8.4 to 13.7 per cent of total spending in 
these areas (Hills  2011 Table 1). (Pension spending grew at a much more rapid rate, 
but is heavily influenced by policies of privatisation and by state subsidy so is omitted 
here). 
 
- Thirdly the UK is in a favourable position compared to many countries in the longer 
term. Projected spending pressures are rather lower than in any other North-West 
European country during the next decade (in fact so low, due to relatively low-cost 
provision and more favourable demography that they do not show on the chart. In the 
longer term they are lower than the EU average and than in most other comparable 
EU members (see Figure 4 calculated from EC 2012). 
 
Figure 4 about here 
Although the OSR services account for much more money, it is in relation to NSR services 
that current debates have been most intense. In the current context welfare state cuts have 
been most stringent in relation to these services and have been particularly heavy in relation 
to some of the most vulnerable groups. However the cuts have been combined with 
restructuring across almost all areas of state activity and particularly for OSR services and 
these have been justified in part by concerns about future pressures in these areas. We now 
turn to the short-term crisis and responses to it. 
An unusual crisis and a distinctive response 
The 2008-9 recession and subsequent stagnation and the policy response to it in the UK have 
been extensively discussed (see Yeates et al 2011 and Gough 2011 for an overview).  Here 
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we comment on how unusual UK experience is in comparison with other countries and how 
distinctive the UK response is along a number of dimensions.   
The distinctive feature of the UK’s economic experience is the depth of the 2008-9 recession 
and the protracted nature of the period of stagnation that has followed it (Figure 5). While 
other major developed countries have returned to growth and passed their 2007 level of GDP 
by 2010-11, the UK remains some 2.6 per cent below that level at the time of writing and is 
unlikely to attain it before the 2015 election at the earliest. The Coalition government’s 
response to economic crisis, heavily influenced by market liberal economic theories, was to 
cut state spending and reduce sharply the level of planned tax rises in order to reduce and 
eliminate the deficit and encourage a private sector-led return to growth.  This strategy has 
not been successful and is now encountering criticism from previously supportive bodies 
such as IMF and OECD, although expressed in the cautious and neutral language such 
agencies employ (for example ‘In the United Kingdom … greater near-term flexibility in the 
path of fiscal adjustment should be considered in the light of lackluster private demand’ IMF 
2013, 49). 
Figure 5 about here 
The cuts are distinctive in that they detach UK public spending from its historic position at 
roughly the middle of the G7 group of large capitalist economies (France, Germany, Italy 
above, Canada, US and Japan below) and set it on a downward trajectory, after the 2007-9 
burst of spending on benefits and jobs and the contraction of the GDP denominator. As 
argued elsewhere (Taylor-Gooby 2013 ch1)  this trajectory will ultimately take the UK below 
public spending in traditional low spenders in the US although the refusal of the economy to 
grow means that the year at which UK spending as a proportion of GDP will fall below that 
in the US is now deferred from 2015 beyond 2017 (Figure 6).  
Students of elections may find Figure 7 interesting from Treasury 2013, Table B.4. This 
shows a temporary rise in state spending of about £47bn in 2013-14, interrupting the 
downward trajectory that follows from the logic of the government’s long-term strategy. £3 
bn of this is accounted for by higher debt interest, but the larger components are an extra 
12bn for locally financed current expenditure (made possible by business rate retention) and 
£31bn extra public sector investment – the infrastructure programme, money to support bank 
lending and money to support house purchase. At first sight the willingness of government to 
increase spending contradicts its political economic strategy. It of course has nothing to do 
with the election due in 2015. 
Figures 6 and 7 about here 
The detail of cuts is also distinctive: focused particularly on NSR services for women, 
children and those on low incomes. Full details are given in the Women’s Budget Group 
analyses of public spending (WBG 2011a, b, 2012a, b) and by Yvette Cooper’s House of 
Commons Library calculation of the incidence of personal tax and benefit reforms (Cooper 
2012). The OSR area escapes relatively lightly, officially designated as protected but in 
practice subjected to very substantial capital and some current cutbacks, and the raising of the 
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pension age, while the uprating formula has become more generous. This resilience again 
points to the political strength of OSR services. Figure 8 covers tax and benefit changes 
(Joyce 2012) while Figure 9, from the 2013 Budget papers (HM Treasury 2013) also includes 
estimates of the impact of reforms in services in kind, assuming that the value of the service 
is equivalent to the cost of provision for each recipient. The impact on services in kind is 
revealed through the Departmental Spending Limits.  The graphs show how the combined 
impact of tax and benefit cuts bears on better off and poorest groups. Figure 8 shows that it is 
greatest for households with children, and bears most discriminatingly on the poor among 
working age people without children. In addition cuts impact most strongly on the local 
government areas with the greatest of low incomes in the parts of the country where 
economic recovery is weakest and wage-decline greatest (HoC Library 2011). 
Figures 8 and 9 about here 
The cuts are also distinctive in the way in which they are ambitiously combined with major 
restructuring of almost all state services. The restructuring is an important feature of OSR as 
well as NSR reform and in this area is justified in terms of future rather than current cost 
savings and the need to achieve greater cost-efficiency in the long-term. It includes two main 
elements: the open government programme of extending principles of new public 
management through markets across every possible area of state activity and extending the 
role of private (and in some cases third sector) organisations in competition, with a strong 
emphasis on competition on price rather than quality (Cabinet Office 2011). Innovative 
payment by results schemes are also being introduced.  
Further reforms to the benefits system involve simplification and greater transparency for 
state pensions and of short-term benefits brought together as universal credit, strengthening 
of work incentives and a greater role for the private sector and individual responsibility in the 
area of pension provision. While it is impossible to do justice to reforms of this magnitude 
without extended discussion, it may be noted that they involve substantial risks (see for 
example Taylor-Gooby 2013c), are not justified as we have seen in terms of longer-term 
spending pressures and so far as we can tell are likely to damage the quality of output when 
competition is on price rather than quality (Gaynor et al. 2010, Gaynor and Town 2012, 76-
7). 
One suggestion is that the longer term objective of the reforms, at least on the part of some in 
government, is to use restructuring to entrench the shift to a liberal form of state as a 
permanent feature of British life so that the move to a contract state spending is embedded. 
This may be reinforced by briefly observing the historical experience of cuts in the UK 
against the overall trajectory of public spending.  The longer-term history of peacetime public 
spending in the UK as in most other countries is of a series of plateaux with the level of the 
plateau moved upwards (never downwards) by major shocks such as wars. Public spending in 
the UK hovered around ten per cent of GDP during the second half of the 19th century, rose to 
20 per cent during the Boer war, fell back to 15 per cent, then peaked at 55 per cent during 
World War I, fell back to around 30 per cent, reached 70 per cent during World War II and 
has fluctuated around 40 per cent ever since.  A number of governments from 1921 onwards 
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have implemented major cutbacks intended to address economic crises by reducing spending.  
In all cases the level of cuts achieved is substantially below that anticipated and in all cases 
spending had returned to the previous level within five years.  
The key examples are the Geddes Axe of 1921-2, the 1931 Coalition government cuts, the 
Callaghan cut in the mid-1970s, Thatcher’s rolling back of the state during the next decade, 
the Major cuts after the recession of the early 1990s and Brown’s spending restrictions from 
2007 onwards (Figure 10: for a detailed discussion see Taylor-Gooby 2012a).  Whether the 
process of embedding will achieve a different outcome this time is unclear Pressures to 
restore spending come from various directions: from local government, as in the 1920s, when 
it was less subject to central control than now, from concerns about civil disorder, strikes and 
a naval mutiny as in the 1930s, from the desire to appease voters, as in the restoration of the 
1980s cuts before the 1992 election, and from the resistance of the state apparatus to 
contraction, as in the relatively modest 2007 Spending Review cut-backs  (Dunsire and Hood 
1989, Hood, Emerson and Dixon, 2010, Peacock and Wiseman 1967, IFS, 2011). 
Figure 10 about here 
There is also some indication that the detail as well as the volume of UK cuts is cross-
nationally distinctive. In most cases reported in the 2011 OECD survey of 29 western 
countries, cuts run across all services and are not concentrated on NSR provisions (OECD 
2011). 
 Embedding rests on reforms which weaken both the internal and external forces helping 
sustain state sector resilience. Budget maximising managers, professional associations and 
trade unions are all weakened by privatisation and fragmentation of services. Externally, 
cultural support for services and their capacity to operate as social institutions that reinforce 
the experience of cohesion are both damaged by the fragmentation and individualisation of 
provision in consumerist choice between a range of profit-oriented suppliers. This reinforces 
the individualising context of short-term benefit reform with its stress on curbing 
irresponsibility and on individual effort. Thus OSR reform may be seen as a long game and 
one that buttresses the immediate attack on stigmatised minority services. 
So far the discussion has highlighted the points that: 
- Social provision in the UK is heavily and increasingly dualised between OSR and 
NSR services 
- For long-run structural reasons, reinforced by and feeding political and media 
communications, this division moralises NSR provision, especially those areas 
associated with low income and unemployment 
- Current government policies follow this division to embed welfare state cutbacks 
permanently and achieve a shift to a more individualised, liberal climate of ideas 
- This involves immediate cuts in the least popular short-term services, attacking 
primarily benefits and services that help women, children and the poor 
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- It also involves major restructuring of OSR services leading to extensive 
privatisation, so that the welfare state does not provide an institutional experience 
of collective responsibility. 
- The fact that the areas which are most heavily under attack are highly unpopular 
makes it hard for pro-welfare actors to defend social provision. 
We now consider various approaches to social provision and the kind of strategy that might 
be able to gain popular support. 
New strategies for social welfare 
Resistance to privatisation and fragmentation of OSR services goes with the grain of public 
attitudes and from that point of view is straightforward. The agenda of individualisation and 
consumerism raises issues that are more challenging and may be difficult to advance without 
strengthening the framework of common services. The issues of trust and the capacity of 
OSR services to sustain it are of major importance and are considered elsewhere (see Taylor-
Gooby 2009 for an extended discussion). 
NSR provision especially that directed at the poor presents the most intractable issues.  We 
have argued that the problems are not simply issues of communication and of constructing an 
attractive political programme but of finding a way to address changes that are highly salient 
in current politics, but are rooted in long-run structural features of society. We also suggest 
that any satisfactory programme must help to build collectivism rather than entrench the 
social divisions which hamper current attempts to develop state welfare. 
There are three main directions in recent debates about the best way forward in welfare that 
address these issues: contribution, predistribution and investment. The latter two areas are 
often linked to ideas of prevention. 
Contribution offers a means of harnessing deep-seated assumptions about entitlement and 
reciprocity to underpin the legitimacy of welfare.  A reciprocal contribution justifies 
entitlement (Gintis et al, 2005, ch1).  The approach can be developed more broadly or more 
narrowly.  Horton and Gregory’s account of a contribution-based welfare system (2009) 
encompasses a wide range of useful social activities as making a contribution to society.  The 
outcome is that activities such as caring for children, sick or elderly people, voluntary work 
and training to ensure one could participate in paid work in the future are credited to one’s 
contribution record bearing entitlement for benefits, as well as the cash contributions of 
traditional social insurance.  Bell and Gaffney (2012) discuss and partially cost a more 
detailed programme resting on extensions to social insurance as it existed in the recent past. 
Frank Field argues for a more limited strictly work-based contribution system analogous to 
Bismarkian social insurance (Field 2013).  James Purnell and more recently Graeme Cooke 
(2011) have developed a salary insurance loan scheme directed specifically at relatively well-
paid workers and designed to top up benefits. 
The logic of these schemes is that contribution is ‘psychological gold-dust’ (as Horton and 
Gregory put it), and insulates welfare from stigma.  The downside is that they inevitably 
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distinguish contributors from non-contributors, even in the most extensive Fabian society 
schemes and focus public antipathy on groups which are likely to be particularly weak in 
labour market attachment and vulnerable. 
Predistributive programmes focus on the distribution of market incomes (Hacker 2011). For 
those at the bottom in low paid and often part-time work, incomes are simply insufficient to 
support a decent family life. One result is the massive expansion of means-tested income 
support programmes mainly covering the working poor, such as tax credit and housing and 
council tax benefits, from one to thirty per cent of the DWP or equivalent budget since the 
late 1970s (Browne and Hood 2012). 
Predistribution would seek to improve wages by imposing (or in the case of some imaginative 
Labour party proposals) encouraging employers to pay at the Living Wage level, some 20 per 
cent above Minimum Wage.  This involves issues of transition which would have to be 
staged and might differ in different industries (Pennycook 2012). The approach might also 
involve strengthening bargaining power through Works Councils, more representative 
remuneration committees and repeal of some anti-Trade Union laws (Coats 2012). More 
ambitious but vaguer discussion suggests controls on rent levels, utility prices and other costs 
that face many people and extending pre-distribution to cover social investment through 
training and education programmes, extending during working life, to ensure broader access 
to wage incomes (Carlin 2012, 2). 
This approach is clearly interventionist. It sidesteps concern about the desert of claimers by 
focusing on market incomes and therefore on work.  It would require support from a benefit 
system to cover those not in work. 
Social investment seeks to move away from concerns about benefit entitlement by stressing 
the value across society of state interventions. Ben-Galim and others have estimated the net 
value of a universal child care programme as up to some £5,000 a year for each mother able 
to move from full-time childcare to full-time work on average wages as a result (Ben-Galim 
2012). The sum is based on tax income and benefits saved. Even without such a shift the cost 
of such a programme might be much less than headline figures and it would also contribute to 
gender equality. A corresponding scheme for elder care might release comparable amounts 
(Pickard et al 2012). 
Social investment seeks to justify welfare spending on economic grounds. Many activities 
could be seen as investment including health care, decent housing to ensure mobility and 
prevent disease and transport. Most work is focused on education and training where the 
natural experiment of the 1973 raising of the school leaving age indicates a returns exceeding 
10 per cent annually to the individuals in enhanced earning capacity and a likelihood of a net 
social gain (Dickson and Smith 2011). It grows increasingly difficult to justify interventions 
on investment grounds the further one moves from education, training and child/social care, 
because it is uncertain how the return attributable to an intervention, for example, in social 
housing or wage support can be identified. 
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The obvious problem with the various pro-welfare strategies is that each applies to particular 
groups. Even if contribution is stretched to include unwaged activities such as informal care, 
there are substantial numbers among the most vulnerable groups not in a position to 
contribute obviously to society. Similarly, pre-distribution applies to those in paid work. 
Social investment is rather narrower in its application. As the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills concludes in its analysis of education and training, investment in 
‘individuals in the middle of the distribution rather than at the bottom may be more (cost) 
effective’ (Crawford et al. 2011, 5). In general returns on the poorest are low. All these 
approaches, which try to situate a more generous and redistributive welfare system within the 
confines of market-based values, risk reinstating social divisions. 
Re-framing the welfare state 
It is easy to rediscover the truism that capitalist market societies tend to create inequalities 
and move to the position that the problems of poverty and inequality are intractable. Any 
defence of state welfare is trapped between the valorisation of work as the legitimate source 
of income for those of working age and acceptance of the authority of the market in 
determining access to and reward from work. The forces that defend labour interests tend to 
fragment, capital becomes more mobile and powerful and inequalities stretch out as a result 
of long-term secular shifts towards greater globalisation, more post-industrial social and 
economic structures and more financialised system of risk, (Pierson 2001; Hay and Wincott 
2012, ch 1). All European countries have moved towards greater inequality and a falling 
wage share (Bailey et al 2011; ILO 2013, 19; Atkinson 2007). The UK is distinguished by the 
size of its financial sector, its lack of a strong collectivist tradition and the speed with which it 
has moved to a pattern of inequalities much closer to that of the US. 
The welfare state faces further difficulties from population ageing, rising expectations and 
Baumol wage drift in the human services, affecting the most costly areas of provision. Since 
these areas are popular it is likely that resources will be found, imposing further pressures on 
spending on cheaper but more contested redistribution towards the poor. 
Inequalities can be ameliorated within these confines through policies that improve access to 
work (most importantly in the recent past, child care, parental workplace rights and anti-
discrimination legislation) and affect earnings (minimum wage, wage supplement and 
equality rulings). Such approaches tend to encounter the continuing pressures to hold down 
wages at the bottom, setting limits to a realistic minimum wage and making wage 
supplements unpopular. Some commentators argue that long-term investments in training 
will enable the labour market to move towards a higher-wage equilibrium by enhancing 
productivity, but this requires sustained investment in hard-to-reach groups. Hours spent in 
training have in fact declined in recent years in the UK: ‘including those not training, we find 
an overall reduction in average annual number of days per worker from 51.2 to 34.9 days, a 
fall of 32%’ between 2006 and 2012 (Green et al. 2012, 10). 
These considerations suggest that any solution requires reframing of the way work, reward 
and state welfare are conceptualised. In relation to work and reward, many commentators 
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question how much inequality is acceptable. Whether policies that put a ceiling on top 
incomes or bonuses are enforceable and how far they are damaging to economic 
competitiveness is unclear, despite recent short-term attempts to do so. A greater degree of 
intervention is implied by the sociological tradition that may be traced from Marx’s early 
romantic notion to labour as ‘life’s chief want’ through Durkheim and more recently Sennett 
(2008) and Strangleman (2012). This argues that work should be primarily understood as 
creativity and the expression of craft skill associated with producing, meeting ‘the desire to 
do a job well for its own sake’ as Sennett put it (2008). If work is valued for its own sake 
rather than as a counter in a cash-nexus, the next questions are how far individuals should 
have a right to work and whether this is a right that the state should supply. 
Welfare-to-work programmes insist that unemployed people take part usually in low-grade 
work as a condition of benefit on the assumption that this will help them enter full-time paid 
employment. The track-record of such schemes is disappointing (DWP 2012). The approach 
that sees work as creativity would argue for a much wider range of employment to be 
available. It might also raise issues about control over work and over the product of work, 
leading to arguments for greater industrial democracy through work councils and union 
rights. Such shifts are long-term but governments could make a start by extending such rights 
into the current Work Programme. 
This raises issues about the role of government. The debate has been located between the 
poles of liberalism, in which government is limited to maintaining the conditions for 
successful operation of the free market, and Keynesian/Beveridge style intervention, in which 
government manipulates interest rates, pump primes investment during downturns and 
provides benefits for the casualties of the market. A different approach would extend 
responsibility to the quality of work rather than simply the employment rate and productivity, 
and would conceptualise this in terms of creative engagement and in the exercise of rights. 
Such a programme is substantially different from the current approach, which imposes yet 
harsher conditions on entitlement, and appears substantially endorsed by public opinion. 
Some commentators argue that the structure of the benefit system influences popular 
attitudes, suggesting for example that Nordic countries are able to sustain more generous 
welfare rights than most other European countries, because less stringent entitlement 
conditions reinforce the idea that claimers are not seeking benefits in preference to paid work 
(Rothstein 2009, Larsen 2013 10-22). This suggests that gradual moves towards a different 
approach to welfare might be cumulative and might develop respect for the intrinsic value of 
work among claimers, and a corresponding respect for claimers as workers. The first steps 
might include stronger rights to participation in works councils for all workers, (currently the 
UK is implementing the EC directive requiring European Works Councils in larger firms 
operating in two or more EU countries) and to extend these to unemployed people provided 




This paper has pointed to twin pressures on the UK welfare state arising from the likely 
expansion of the ‘old social risks’, associated primarily with ageing, and the emergence of 
‘new social risks’ as women and mothers become full members of the labour market and as 
work, for many, becomes less secure. It argues that old social risks trump new social risks, 
and the outcome is cumulating pressures on incomes at the bottom in a more unequal world. 
A number of policies intended to tackle the issues are reviewed. It is difficult to see how the 
core issue, that people of working age seeking benefits are not valued, can be addressed 
without a reframing of approaches to work, welfare and citizenship rights. Such a shift is not 
practicable in the short term. Government however could pursue changes which might lead to 
a greater valuing of the contribution of those at the bottom, by establishing a right to work, by 
providing meaningful employment for them and by engaging workers as industrial citizens in 
a dialogue with capital through greater industrial democracy. 
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Figure 2: Support for more spending the poor by generation (BSA/ Ipsos)
 
Pre-war: born before 1944 
Baby boomer: born 1945-66 
Generation X: 1966-79 




Figure 3: Three (incompatible) conditions for welfare 
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Figure 6: A distinctive spending response: public spending % GDP (IMF) 
 
 

















Figure 8: Distinctive incidence: impact of tax/benefit cuts on incomes (2010-15 by decile 
%; IFS) 
 
Figure 9: Impact of 2010-11 to 2014-15 changes as % 2010 household income, quintiles 
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